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Fitting a Gun in a Circle–a How-To 
Guide: A Comprehensive Look at the 
Standard of Review for Gun Regulations 
Under the Second Amendment 
BETH COPLOWITZ* 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court’s 
landmark Second Amendment case, the Court held that the 
right to bear arms is an individual right aimed at self-de-
fense in the home. Two years later, McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago extended this right to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, lower courts were left with little guid-
ance on what level of scrutiny to apply to gun regulations. 
As a result, courts have applied various levels of scrutiny 
including intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, a two-step 
inquiry that leads to either intermediate or strict scrutiny, 
and an undue burden standard. Of these, courts seem to fa-
vor the hybrid two-step test. 
This Comment will propose a more comprehensive and 
workable method to determine what standard of review to 
apply to gun regulations—the circle model used in the con-
text of church autonomy and freedom of religion protected 
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by the First Amendment. This model advocates an epicenter 
comprised of a core right that has two concentric circles re-
volving around the epicenter. The farther away one moves 
from the core, the fewer rights one has and the less scrutiny 
should be applied to any regulations falling within those cir-
cles. The circle model would provide guidance on what level 
of scrutiny to apply to regulations depending on where in 
this model they fall. This Comment will concentrate specifi-
cally on the “who.” The Author will demonstrate how to ap-
ply this model to different types of individuals to determine 
where in this model these individuals fall and thus what level 
of scrutiny to apply to regulations targeting them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“At 2:09 a.m., a warning appeared on the club’s Facebook page: 
‘Everyone get out of pulse and keep running.’”1 It was Latin night 
at Pulse, a gay nightclub, and what should have been a night full of 
spirited salsa dancing turned into a deadly nightmare.2 Omar Ma-
teen, who called 911 during the attack to pledge allegiance to ISIS,3 
opened fire at the Orlando nightclub on June 12, 2016, between 2:02 
AM and 5:15 AM,4 killing forty-nine people and wounding fifty-
three.5 Individuals locked themselves in bathroom stalls and played 
dead while waiting for the police to arrive.6 One survivor, Angel 
Colon, who was shot three times in the leg, miraculously stayed si-
lent as Mateen continued to shoot his hand and hip.7 Those trapped 
inside the club frantically called and messaged friends and rela-
tives.8 Mateen legally purchased the two weapons he used at Pulse 
the week before the shooting.9 This horrific attack marks “the dead-
liest mass shooting in the United States.”10 
                                                                                                             
 1 Ariel Zambelich, 3 Hours in Orlando: Piecing Together an Attack and Its 
Aftermath, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (June 26, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/
2016/06/16/482322488/orlando-shooting-what-happened-update. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Ralph Ellis et al., Orlando Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooter Pledged ISIS Alle-
giance, CNN (June 13, 2016, 11:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/or-
lando-nightclub-shooting/. 
 4 Zambelich, supra note 1. 
 5 Id.; Ellis, supra note 3. 
 6 Jack Healy & John Eligon, Orlando Survivors Recall Night of Terror: 





 7 Id. 
 8 Id.; Ellis, supra note 3. 
 9 Zambelich, supra note 1. 
 10 Ellis, supra note 3; Zambelich, supra note 1. It should be noted that over 
the course of writing this paper, I had to rewrite the introductory paragraph several 
times due to the number of mass shootings in America that took place over the 
span of a few months. I wanted to open with the most recent American shooting, 
and unfortunately, the difficulty in staying current sheds light on the terrible real-
ity of the frequency of mass shootings. 
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In District of Columbia v. Heller,11 the Supreme Court’s land-
mark Second Amendment case, the Court held that the right to bear 
arms is an individual right aimed at self-defense in the home.12 Two 
years later, McDonald v. City of Chicago13 extended this right to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.14 However, after Heller 
and McDonald, many questions were left unanswered, such as “‘the 
scope of [the Heller] right beyond the home15 and the standards for 
determining whether and how the right can be burdened by govern-
mental regulation.’”16 Heller did state, however, that the right to 
bear arms is not absolute and many longstanding handgun regula-
tions are “presumptively lawful.”17 It is no surprise that after            
these decisions some would advocate for stricter gun regulations,18 
                                                                                                             
 11 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 12 Id. at 635. 
 13 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 14 Id. at 750 (“We have previously held that most of the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights apply with full force to both the Federal Government and the States. 
Applying the standard that is well established in our case law, we hold that the 
Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.”). 
 15 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36, 940 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Nor 
can we ignore the implication of the analysis that the constitutional right of armed 
self-defense is broader than the right to have a gun in one’s home.”); Kachalsky 
v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that regu-
lating the carrying of a firearm in public did implicate the Second Amendment, 
but that it did not burden the core right of self-defense in the home—a “critical 
difference” between this case and Heller because the government’s authority to 
regulate handguns “is qualitatively different in public than in the home”). But see 
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875–76 (4th Cir. 2013) (declining to decide 
whether the Second Amendment protections apply outside the home). 
 16 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 874 (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 
458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011)); see Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (“What we know from 
[Heller and McDonald] is that Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith 
within the home. What we do not know is the scope of that right beyond the home 
and the standards for determining when and how the right can be regulated by a 
government.”) (citation omitted). 
 17 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
 18 Max Ehrenfreund & Zachary A. Goldfarb, 11 Essential Facts About Guns 
and Mass Shootings in the United States, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (June 18, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/06/18/11-es-
sential-facts-about-guns-and-mass-shootings-in-the-united-states/ (Many Ameri-
cans support the right to bear arms as well as specific restrictions, such as back-
ground checks, assault weapons bans, and a federal database to track guns. Fifty-
eight percent of Americans said they favored stricter gun control laws in a 2012 
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especially in light of the large number of mass shootings in America 
in 2016 alone19––such as the one in Orlando  described above. 
Amid this confusion, courts and commentators have struggled to 
grapple with what level of scrutiny to apply to gun regulations. 
Courts are split on this issue and have applied various levels of scru-
tiny to determine whether gun regulations pass constitutional mus-
ter.20 These levels of scrutiny range from intermediate scrutiny to 
strict scrutiny, to a two-step inquiry that leads to either intermediate 
or strict scrutiny, to an undue burden standard.21 Of these, courts 
seem to favor the hybrid two-step test.22 
In order to provide courts with a more comprehensive and work-
able method to determine what standard of review to apply to gun 
regulations, the circle model used in the context of church autonomy 
and freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment should 
                                                                                                             
Gallup poll following a school shooting in Newton, Connecticut). But see Art 
Swift, Less Than Half of Americans Support Stricter Gun Laws, GALLUP (Oct. 31, 
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179045/less-half-americans-support-stricter-
gun-laws.aspx (forty-seven percent of Americans said they favored stricter gun 
control laws in a 2014 Gallup poll). 
 19 Mass Shootings - 2016, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, http://www.gunvio-
lencearchive.org/reports/mass-shooting (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). 
 20 See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org., Inc. 
v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 
1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Heller II]; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 
684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011); Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 782–84, 786 (9th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marz-
zarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 
642 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32 
(D. Utah 2009); United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163–64 (D. Me. 
2008). 
 21 See sources cited supra note 20. 
 22 Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s 
“Schools” and “Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537, 558 (2014) (“The 
overwhelming majority of federal courts of appeals that have entertained post-
Heller Second Amendment claims have adopted a two-step approach for analyz-
ing such claims.”) (citation omitted); Daniel J. Bolin & Brent O. Denzin, When 
All Heller Breaks Loose: Gun Regulation Considerations for Zoning and Plan-
ning Officials Under the New Second Amendment, 44 URB. LAW. 677, 683 (2012) 
(stating that the majority of courts that have announced a standard of review for 
challenged gun regulations have adopted the two-step test). 
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be adopted.23 This model advocates an epicenter comprised of a core 
right that has two concentric circles revolving around the epicen-
ter.24 The farther away one moves from the core, the fewer rights 
one has and the less scrutiny should be applied to any regulations 
falling within those circles.25 Using this model would provide guid-
ance to courts to better determine whether gun regulations focusing 
on the “who, what, where, and how” pass constitutional muster. Spe-
cifically, this model would provide guidance on what level of scru-
tiny to apply to such regulations depending on where in this circle 
model they fall. 
This Comment will concentrate specifically on the “who” and 
propose a working model using the circle diagram to determine what 
standard of scrutiny to apply to regulations targeting specific indi-
viduals. Although regulations that focus on the “what, where, and 
how,”––regulations focusing on what type of guns can be used,26 
whether they can be used in the home versus outside of the home,27 
and regulations relating to open carry versus concealed carry28––
would certainly benefit from further analysis and provide useful 
guidance to the courts, they are not the focus of this Comment. The 
Author will use examples of gun regulations targeting specific indi-
viduals to show how this model would work and will provide guid-
ance on what level of scrutiny to apply to individuals falling within 
certain circles around the core right of self-defense in the home. 
Part I will examine the decisions of Heller and McDonald as 
they relate to the evolution of the right to bear arms and the uncer-
tainty they created among lower courts struggling to determine what 
level of scrutiny to apply to gun regulations. Part II will discuss the 
various levels of scrutiny lower courts have applied and commenta-
tors have advocated post-Heller. Part III will describe the circle 
model of the Second Amendment by initially providing an overview 
of how it has been used in relation to church autonomy and the First 
                                                                                                             
 23 See Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical 
Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
1514, 1539 (1979). 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. at 1539–40. 
 26 See, e.g., Fla Stat. §§ 790.16; 790.221 (2016). 
 27 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §790.251 (2016). 
 28 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §790.25 (2016). 
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Amendment. Part III will then explain why this model, which in the 
Second Amendment context builds off pre-existing models such as 
Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach as well as the two-step 
and sliding-scale models, allows for nuance and structure, making it 
best-suited for examining Second Amendment regulations. This 
section will then demonstrate how to apply this model to different 
types of individuals to determine where in this model they fall and 
thus what level of scrutiny to apply to regulations targeting them. 
Therefore, even if readers do not agree with the specific application 
of the model presented herein, the approach itself still works, allow-
ing a reader to choose where in the model he believes an individual 
should fall. The Comment will conclude with final thoughts. 
I. HELLER AND MCDONALD—PRECEDENT-SETTING CASES WITHOUT 
MUCH PRECEDENT 
The Second Amendment proscribes that “[a] well regulated Mi-
litia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”29 Based on 
recent jurisprudence, we now know that at the very least, an individ-
ual has a fundamental right to bear arms in the home for the purpose 
of self-defense.30 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,31 the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession 
of usable handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment.32 
Respondent Heller, a D.C. special police officer, applied to register 
a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused.33 
Heller filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia seeking to enjoin the city from barring the registration of 
                                                                                                             
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 30 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581, 635 (2008). 
 31 554 U.S. 570. 
 32 Id. at 573–75 (The District of Columbia law banned handgun possession 
by making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registra-
tion of handguns; prohibited any person from carrying an unlicensed handgun, but 
authorized the police chief to issue one-year licenses; and required residents to 
keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock 
or similar device.). 
 33 Id. at 575. 
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handguns, from enforcing the licensing requirement, and from en-
forcing the trigger-lock requirement because these requirements 
banned the use of functional firearms in the home.34 
The Supreme Court held that “the Second Amendment right is 
exercised individually and belongs to all Americans,” thus establish-
ing that there is a fundamental, individual right to bear arms in the 
home for self-defense.35 The Second Amendment does not protect 
the right of individuals to “carry arms for any sort of confronta-
tion”36—“the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the 
Second Amendment right,”37 and the need for self-defense is most 
acute in the home.38 
However, the Court made clear that the right to bear arms is not 
absolute and can be regulated by stating that although the “Second 
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms . . . 
the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of 
free speech was not . . . .”39 The Court further established that limi-
tations can be imposed on the Second Amendment by drawing at-
tention to lawful, longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places, and laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.40 In one of the opin-
ion’s most important footnotes, the Court went on to explain that the 
longstanding prohibitions or regulations it listed were not an exhaus-
tive list, but were mere examples of lawful regulations.41 
                                                                                                             
 34 Id. at 575–76. 
 35 Id. at 581. 
 36 Id. at 595. 
 37 Id. at 628. 
 38 Id. (“[T]he home [is] where the need for defense of self, family, and prop-
erty is most acute.”). 
 39 Id. at 595. 
 40 Id. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
 41 Id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). 
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Most significantly, the Supreme Court did not establish what 
level of scrutiny should be applied to gun regulations in this land-
mark case.42 The majority merely held that the handgun ban in ques-
tion was unconstitutional, regardless of the standard of scrutiny ap-
plied.43 This was because the handgun ban in Heller was a prohibi-
tion of an 
entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen 
by American society for that lawful purpose. The 
prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where 
the need for defense of self, family, and property is 
most acute. Under any of the standards of scrutiny 
that we have applied to enumerated constitutional 
rights, banning from the home “the most preferred 
firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection 
of one’s home and family,” would fail constitutional 
muster.44 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer rejected the use of strict scrutiny 
because the laws the majority claimed were presumptively lawful 
and constitutional would not survive strict scrutiny, so this could not 
actually be the standard.45 Additionally, he noted that adoption of a 
true strict scrutiny standard of review to evaluate the constitutional-
ity of gun regulations would be “impossible” because this standard 
is really a balancing test in disguise.46 Practically every gun regula-
tion advances a “‘primary concern of every government––a concern 
for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens.’”47 Using the strict 
scrutiny standard will “in practice turn into an interest-balancing in-
quiry,” so an interest-balancing inquiry should be explicitly 
adopted.48 Thus, Justice Breyer overtly recommended an interest-
                                                                                                             
 42 Id. at 628–29. 
 43 Id. (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enu-
merated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm 
in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ would 
fail constitutional muster.”). 
 44 Id. (citation omitted). 
 45 Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 46 Id. at 689. 
 47 Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)). 
 48 Id. (The interests protected by the Second Amendment will be weighed 
against the governmental public-safety concerns, with the “only question being 
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balancing inquiry that “asks whether the statute burdens a protected 
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the stat-
ute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental inter-
ests.”49 The Court rejected this approach as too free-wheeling50 be-
cause it would require the judiciary to rule on a case-by-case basis 
“whether a constitutional right is actually worth insisting upon.”51 
Moreover, as the Court stated, requiring firearms in the home to be 
kept inoperable at all times “makes it impossible for citizens to use 
them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense” and is unconstitu-
tional.52 Thus, the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right 
to self-defense in his home.53 
More recently, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,54 the Supreme 
Court relied on the Court’s holding in Heller55 and stated that self-
defense is a basic right and “individual self-defense is ‘the central 
component’ of the Second Amendment right.”56 The Court held that 
the Second Amendment right to possess a handgun in the home for 
self-defense “is fully applicable to the States” under the Due Process 
                                                                                                             
whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of 
advancing the latter.”). 
 49 Id. at 689–90. 
 50 Id. at 634 (majority opinion) (“We know of no other enumerated constitu-
tional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-
balancing’ approach.”). 
 51 Michael J. Habib, Note, The Future of Gun Control Laws Post-McDonald 
and Heller and the Death of One-Gun-Per-Month Legislation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 
1339, 1367 (2012). 
 52 Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
 53 Id. at 635. 
 54 The city of Chicago and the village of Oak Park had laws similar to the 
District of Columbia’s, effectively banning the possession of handguns by private 
citizens. Petitioners filed suit, alleging that the handgun ban and ordinances vio-
lated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Chicago and Oak Park argued that 
their laws were constitutional because the Second Amendment was not applicable 
to the States. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750, 752 (2010). 
 55 Id. at 780 (“[O]ur central holding in Heller: that the Second Amendment 
protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably 
for self-defense within the home.”); see Alex Poor, Bearing the Burden of Denial: 
Observations of Lower Court Decisions Misapplying Supreme Court Precedent 
in Second Amendment Cases, 67 S.M.U. L. Rev. 401, 402, 411 (2014). 
 56 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599). 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.57 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court in McDonald echoed Heller in holding that the challenged gun 
regulation at issue in Heller “would fail constitutional muster” under 
“any of the standards of scrutiny”58 and did not establish what level 
of scrutiny to apply to gun regulations,59 leaving lower courts in a 
state of confusion as to what level of review to apply. 
II. AN ARRAY OF SCRUTINY 
Because the Court “did not announce a standard for lower courts 
to apply” in enforcing the Second Amendment right in Heller and 
McDonald,60 lower courts, left to their own devices, have applied 
various degrees of scrutiny.61 The most popular has been a two-step 
inquiry,62 but before explaining that standard, this Comment will ex-
amine the other various levels of scrutiny courts have applied to gun 
regulations. 
                                                                                                             
 57 Id. at 750, 759, 791. In Malloy v. Hogan, the Supreme Court, based on the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, held that “incorporated Bill 
of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights 
against federal encroachment.’” Id. at 759, 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1, 10 (1964)). The Court held that “particular Bill of Rights guarantees or 
remedies” applied to the states. Id. at 766. The Second Amendment right is incor-
porated in the concept of due process because the right to keep and bear arms, i.e. 
the right to self-defense, is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and 
“‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Id. at 767 (quoting Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). The “Framers and ratifiers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” considered the right to keep and bear arms “neces-
sary to our system of ordered liberty.” Id. at 778. 
 58 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 59 Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How is a court to determine whether a 
particular firearm regulation . . . is consistent with the Second Amendment? What 
kind of constitutional standard should the court use? How high a protective hurdle 
does the Amendment erect?”). 
 60 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 680. 
 61 Caroline L. Moran, Under the Gun: Will States’ One-Gun-Per-Month 
Laws Pass Constitutional Muster After Heller and McDonald?, 38 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 163,174, 176 (2014). 
 62 See infra note 118. 
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A. Competing Views Among Lower Courts 
1. STRICT SCRUTINY 
Few courts have adopted strict scrutiny,63 requiring that in order 
for a law to be upheld, it must be necessary to achieve a compelling 
state interest64 and it must be narrowly tailored to achieve this inter-
est.65 Despite this supposedly rigorous standard, the courts that have 
applied strict scrutiny have upheld challenged gun regulations as 
constitutional.66 
2. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
Few courts have applied intermediate scrutiny,67 requiring that 
in order for a regulation to be upheld, it must be substantially related 
to an important governmental objective.68 In United States v. 
Skoien,69 defendant Steven Skoien was convicted of two misde-
meanor counts of domestic violence and as a result violated 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) when he was found in possession of a shotgun.70 
Skoien appealed his two-year imprisonment sentence, contending 
that § 922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment.71 
In evaluating Skoien’s claim, the Seventh Circuit applied inter-
mediate scrutiny to determine that “a law banning individuals con-
victed of domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing guns 
bore a ‘substantial relation’ to the important government objective 
                                                                                                             
 63 Moran, supra note 61, at 174, 176; see, e.g., United States v. Engstrum, 
609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231–32 (D. Utah 2009); United States v. Booker, 570 F. 
Supp. 2d 161, 163–64 (D. Me. 2008). 
 64 Habib, supra note 51, at 1366. 
 65 Moran, supra note 61, at 177. 
 66 Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 164–65; Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
 67 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 68 Habib, supra note 51, at 1366. 
 69 614 F.3d 638. 
 70 Id. at 639. 
 71 Id. 
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of ‘preventing armed mayhem.’”72 Although the court did not ex-
plicitly explain why it adopted an intermediate level of scrutiny,73 it 
compared Second Amendment regulations to First Amendment reg-
ulations that were examined under an intermediate scrutiny frame-
work.74 The Seventh Circuit merely noted that applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny is “prudent,” that § 922(g)(9) is valid because it is sub-
stantially related to an important governmental objective––prevent-
ing armed mayhem—and that “we need not get more deeply into the 
‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”75 
In determining that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, the court stated 
that because the recidivism rate is high among domestic violence 
offenders, “there are substantial benefits in keeping the most deadly 
weapons out of the hands of domestic abusers.”76 The court also 
noted that domestic abusers often commit acts that if committed 
against strangers would be felonies, as well as the fact that firearms 
are deadly in domestic abuse.77 
3. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD 
Some courts78 have suggested the use of the undue burden stand-
ard used in abortion jurisprudence79 as the standard of scrutiny that 
should be used to assess whether a challenged gun regulation is con-
stitutional. In the abortion context, an undue burden is a regulation 
that places a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
                                                                                                             
 72 Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In Search of A Standard: Gun Regulations After 
Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1161 (2011) (footnote omitted); see 
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642 (“[T]he goal of § 922(g)(9), preventing armed mayhem, 
is an important governmental objective. Both logic and data establish a substantial 
relation between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.”). 
 73 Although the court did explain that a rational basis standard would be in-
appropriate because under this standard any law is valid if a justification for it can 
be imagined. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 641–42. 
 76 Id. at 644; see Kiehl, supra note 72, at 1161. 
 77 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 643–44. 
 78 See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 782–84, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 79 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 n.41 (“pre-viability abortion regu-
lations are unconstitutional if they impose an ‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right 
to terminate her pregnancy”). 
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abortion of a nonviable fetus.”80 The Supreme Court stated that “an 
undue burden is an unconstitutional burden.”81 According to the un-
due burden standard, regulations that substantially burden, or place 
a substantial obstacle in the way of a core right, should receive 
heightened scrutiny.82 
The Ninth Circuit, in Nordyke v. King, addressed “whether the 
Second Amendment prohibits a local government from banning gun 
shows on its property.”83 Originally, the Ninth Circuit adopted an 
undue burden standard when it held that “only regulations that sub-
stantially burden the right to keep and to bear arms should receive 
heightened scrutiny.”84 In explaining its application of an undue bur-
den standard, the court reasoned that Heller and McDonald “urged 
a ‘substantial burden’ approach based on the Supreme Court’s eval-
uation of a regulation’s relationship to the ‘core right’ protected by 
the Second Amendment.”85 The court held that the undue burden 
test would avoid “many of the difficult empirical questions as to the 
effectiveness of gun regulations that would arise under a strict scru-
tiny test.”86 
While applying the undue burden standard, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the county ordinance did not substantially burden the Sec-
ond Amendment as the “ordinance did not make it materially more 
difficult to obtain firearms or create a shortage of places to purchase 
guns in and around the county, because it merely eliminates gun 
shows on government property.”87 
                                                                                                             
 80 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“[A] 
statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid 
state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legiti-
mate ends.”). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 682–83; see Nordyke, 644 F.3d at 782–
84, 786. 
 83 Nordyke, 644 F.3d at 780. 
 84 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 682 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke, 
644 F.3d at 782–84, 786. 
 85 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 682–83 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke, 
644 F.3d at 783. 
 86 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke, 
644 F.3d at 785. 
 87 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke, 
644 F.3d at 787–88. 
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Some courts and commentators have criticized the undue burden 
test “based on its similarity to Justice Breyer’s ‘interest-balancing’ 
approach that was rejected by the Heller and McDonald Courts.”88 
In particular, the undue burden’s substantial obstacle inquiry in re-
lation to a specific regulation is closely related to Justice Breyer’s 
interest-balancing approach, which “asks whether the statute bur-
dens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of pro-
portion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important govern-
mental interests.”89 As one federal judge remarked on the similarity, 
“this court strongly doubts that the Heller majority envisioned the 
undue burden standard when it left for another day a determination 
of the level of scrutiny to be applied to firearms laws.”90 
Nordyke v. King has had a long and complicated procedural his-
tory since first reaching the Ninth Circuit twelve years before that 
court’s most recent opinion in 2012.91 In its most recent ruling, the 
court failed to adopt any standard of scrutiny.92 The Ninth Circuit 
left the undue burden test “in further limbo by declining to apply 
any test in affirming the dismissal of the Second Amendment chal-
lenge after the county reinterpreted its ordinance . . . .”93 The Ninth 
                                                                                                             
 88 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (footnote omitted); see Kiehl, supra 
note 72, at 1156; Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chi-
cago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 437, 446–47 (2011) (Despite Heller’s rejection of the interest-balanc-
ing test, this approach may be inescapable in Second Amendment jurisprudence 
as evidenced by the “historical acceptance of concealed-carry prohibitions [that] 
cannot be explained by anything other than this very type of interest-balancing  
. . . .” To avoid contradicting Heller’s rejection of interest-balancing, “the Court 
may utilize a different form of words, such as an undue burden test, but in practical 
operation, its approach is likely to be little different” than the interest-balancing 
approach.). 
 89 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 90 Kiehl, supra note 72, at 1156 (quoting Heller II, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187 
(D.D.C. 2010)). 
 91 681 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 92 Id. at 1045 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“But I cannot agree with the ma-
jority’s approach, which fails to explain the standard of scrutiny under which it 
evaluates the ordinance.”) (footnote omitted). 
 93 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (footnote omitted); see Nordyke, 
681 F.3d at 1044 (majority opinion) (“No matter how broad the scope of the Sec-
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Circuit adopted a similar approach to gun regulations as the Court 
in Heller94 when it stated that the plaintiffs “in the present case . . . 
cannot succeed, no matter what form of scrutiny applies to Second 
Amendment claims.”95 Thus, it is unclear whether courts will con-
tinue applying the undue burden test.96 
4. THE TWO-STEP TEST—A HYBRID OF STRICT AND INTERMEDIATE 
Another test adopted by lower courts to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of gun regulations is the two-step test97 first adopted by the 
Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella.98 Under this approach, 
“modeled after the approach in First Amendment cases,”99 courts 
first ask whether the challenged regulation imposes a burden on con-
duct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protec-
tion.100 This means courts must determine whether a gun regulation 
has a historical basis, indicating it was within the scope of the Sec-
ond Amendment at the time of ratification.101 If it does not fall 
                                                                                                             
ond Amendment—an issue that we leave for another day—it is clear that, as ap-
plied to Plaintiffs’ gun shows and as interpreted by the County, this regulation is 
permissible.”). 
 94 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (stating that the ban of handguns in the home 
would fail to pass constitutional muster under any standard of scrutiny). 
 95 Nordyke, 681 F.3d at 1045. 
 96 Id. at 1045 n.2 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“All that is clear from the 
majority’s approach is that the majority cannot be evaluating the ordinance under 
strict scrutiny.”); see also Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (explaining that 
the Ninth Circuit left the substantial burden test in limbo). 
 97 See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org., Inc. 
v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 
679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 
F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
 98 614 F.3d at 89. 
 99 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 681; see Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 n.4 
(explaining that the Court will look to First Amendment doctrine to inform its 
analysis of the Second Amendment). 
 100 Pratt, supra note 22, at 558. 
 101 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702–03; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; Chester, 628 F.3d 
at 680; Reese, 627 F.3d at 800–01. 
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within the historical scope of the Second Amendment, then the reg-
ulation is constitutional.102 If the “historical evidence is inconclu-
sive”103 or suggests that the regulation does “burden conduct that the 
Second Amendment protects . . . courts will ask whether it passes 
muster under the appropriate level of heightened review”—either 
strict or intermediate scrutiny. 104 
During this second step, courts will choose a level of scrutiny 
“based on how close the burdened right comes to the core of the 
Second Amendment’s guarantee and how severely the challenged 
[regulation] burdens that right.”105 Regulations that burden the core 
Second Amendment right of armed self-defense in the home should 
be evaluated using strict scrutiny.106 Laws that do not burden the 
core right should be evaluated using intermediate scrutiny.107 This 
two-step test “combines both a historical and an interest-balancing 
inquiry.”108 This two-step hybrid approach was first adopted by the 
Third Circuit, and was later adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Sev-
enth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.109 
Closely related to the two-step model, the application of a slid-
ing-scale model to Second Amendment regulations has been sug-
gested by commentators to determine what level of scrutiny to ap-
ply.110 This model has proven useful in other contexts such as eval-
uating regulations restricting freedom of speech and the right to 
vote.111 Under the sliding-scale model, “the level of scrutiny utilized 
                                                                                                             
 102 Pratt, supra note 22, at 558. 
 103 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703. 
 104 Pratt, supra note 22, at 558. 
 105 Id. at 558–59. 
 106 Moran, supra note 61, at 177; see, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89, 96–
97. 
 107 Moran, supra note 61, at 177; see, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89, 97. 
 108 Lindsay Colvin, History, Heller, and High-Capacity Magazines: What is 
the Proper Standard of Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 1041, 1058 (2014). 
 109 See sources cited supra note 97. 
 110 Michael J. Habib, The Second Amendment Standard of Review: The Quin-
tessential Clean-Slate for Sliding-Scale Scrutiny, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 13, 
13 (2012) (“[T]he Second Amendment provides the quintessential ‘clean slate’ to 
apply a rarely utilized level of judicial review that can be called ‘sliding scale 
scrutiny.’”); Habib, supra note 51, at 1369–70, 1373. 
 111 Habib, supra note 110, at 14 (In explaining the sliding-scale model’s ap-
plication in other contexts: “[w]hile strict scrutiny is generally applied to laws that 
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by a court in assessing the constitutionality of a restrictive regulation 
will vary between strict and intermediate scrutiny, based on the im-
pact the regulation has on the core of the right.”112 The sliding-scale 
model is a “hybrid level of scrutiny.”113 This model is essentially the 
same as the two-step model114 adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.115 Under the 
sliding-scale model, any law that restricts the core right to bear arms 
is subject to strict scrutiny, and any law that does not restrict the 
primary purpose or core of the right to bear arms, “but rather regu-
lates how one may exercise that right,” is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.116 Thus, since Heller and McDonald, lower courts have ap-
plied various standards of scrutiny to gun regulations. 
B. The Verdict is In—Two-Step Wins 
Despite a lack of clear precedent of what level of scrutiny to ap-
ply to Second Amendment challenges,117 the majority of lower 
courts have applied the two-step test as the prevailing standard of 
                                                                                                             
restrict the right to free speech and the right to vote, intermediate scrutiny is used 
in First Amendment regulations that target the time, manner, and place, but not 
content, of speech, and in ballot access cases when the issue is the right to appear 
on a ballot. This means that, for purpose of the First Amendment and the right to 
vote, undoubtedly fundamental rights, there are multiple levels of scrutiny that 
may apply.”). 
 112 Id. at 13. 
 113 Habib, supra note 51, at 1370. 
 114 See Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 680, 683 (To apply the two-part test, 
courts must first decide whether a challenged law restricts conduct falling within 
the scope of the Second Amendment, and if it does not, the inquiry is complete. 
If the law restricts the core right to bear arms, it is subject to strict scrutiny. Reg-
ulations that do not restrict the core right but are lawful under Heller are subject 
to an intermediate level of scrutiny that depends on the type of conduct being 
regulated and the degree to which the law burdens the right.). 
 115 See sources cited supra note 97. 
 116 Habib, supra note 110, at 14–15. According to proponents of the sliding-
scale model, it “would balance the burden of government regulation in the interest 
of public safety with the fundamental right to bear arms and be a more fitting level 
of scrutiny for this unique right.” Id. at 14. This model “will weigh the means by 
which one seeks to exercise the right to bear arms with the end result that the 
regulation will have on the interests protected by the right.” Id. at 14-15. 
 117 Poor, supra note 55, at 402, 417 (the Supreme Court did specify that ra-
tional basis scrutiny and Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach are inappro-
priate standards of review). 
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review for gun regulations.118 As will be discussed below, the pro-
posed use of the circle model in the Second Amendment context will 
build upon the two-step hybrid test of strict and intermediate scru-
tiny to provide courts with a more workable method of establishing 
what level of scrutiny to apply to specific gun regulations.119 
III. THE CIRCLE MODEL AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT—AN 
OBVIOUS COLLABORATION 
A. The Circle Model and the First Amendment—A Genesis Story 
The circle model was first proposed in the context of church au-
tonomy and freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment 
to explain to what extent religious organizations should be allowed 
to discriminate based on the First Amendment’s free exercise of re-
ligion and when the government should be allowed to regulate such 
discriminatory practices.120 Bruce Bagni suggests that the traditional 
balancing approach for “resolving religious organizations’ claims of 
exemption from antidiscrimination laws” based on free exercise of 
religion and church autonomy “has led to unsatisfactory and con-
flicting results”121 to the “detriment of both first amendment values 
and the national commitment to eradicate discrimination.”122 
                                                                                                             
 118 Pratt, supra note 22, at 558 (“The overwhelming majority of federal courts 
of appeals that have entertained post-Heller Second Amendment claims have 
adopted a two-step approach for analyzing such claims.”) (citation omitted). It 
should be noted that a number of commentators incorrectly refer to the two-step 
test as intermediate scrutiny, but in actuality, they are referring to the hybrid two-
step test. See, e.g., Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 683 (stating that the majority 
of courts that have announced a standard of review for challenged gun regulations 
have adopted the “kind of intermediate scrutiny described in Section II.A.” How-
ever, the type of scrutiny discussed in that section of the article was the two-step 
test); Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 88, at 440 n.13 (“At the appellate level, 
there has been something of a trend toward a form of intermediate scrutiny requir-
ing that the challenged regulation be substantially related to an important govern-
mental objective.” These authors then list a string of cases that all employed the 
two-step test.). 
 119 See infra Section III.B. 
 120 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1514, 1539; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General 
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the 
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1402 (1981). 
 121 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1549. 
 122 Id. at 1538–39. 
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The circle model was offered as a “more satisfactory ap-
proach . . . for resolving the conflict between religious liberty and 
the quest for human equality” by providing a more workable method 
for resolving this conflict.123 Bagni starts with the premise that the 
government generally cannot regulate core activities and relation-
ships in a church—those that are “purely spiritual or integral facets 
of the actual practice of the religion.”124 “Emanating from this core 
are a series of activities and relationships with increasing indicia of 
secularity”125 to which decreasing levels of scrutiny apply. This con-
cept is best illustrated by a circle model, with an epicenter consisting 
of the purely spiritual aspects of a church, and three concentric cir-
cles revolving around the epicenter.126  
The epicenter is comprised of the “relationship between a church 
and its clergy and modes of worship and ritual,” as well as member-
ship policies of a church, religious education programs, and church-
operated schools that “teach secular subjects with a decidedly reli-
gious orientation.”127 The first concentric circle emanating from the 
epicenter includes church-sponsored community activities, such as 
adoption agencies, homes for the elderly, hospitals, and schools 
dominated by secular courses in which religiosity is “present but not 
pervasive.”128 This circle also includes relationships between the 
church and “support employees with some religious or quasi-reli-
gious functions.”129 The second circle contains a church’s secular 
business activities and relationships between secular employees, 
such as clerks or janitors, who perform purely nonspiritual func-
tions.130 The third, and outermost, circle is comprised of the “totally 
secular world.”131 
The spiritual epicenter of a church, or the core, can rarely be 
regulated by the government because this would infringe on the 
church’s autonomy and thus would be subject to the highest form of 
                                                                                                             
 123 Id. at 1539. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id.; Laycock, supra note 120, at 1409. 
 126 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539; Laycock, supra note 120, at 1402–03. 
 127 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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scrutiny—strict scrutiny.132 The only type of regulation that might 
be justified in the epicenter is the need to assure the physical safety 
of church members, nonmembers, or of the community.133 A church 
must be afforded the right to discriminate in relation to activities 
falling within its spiritual epicenter, such as selecting its congre-
gants, because the free exercise of religion guarantees this right.134 
Moreover, the members of any specific religious sect must be al-
lowed to freely model their internal structure because the existence 
of their religion depends on this.135 
As one moves further away from the core, the fewer religious 
rights the church has and the less scrutiny should be applied.136 
When a church’s activities fall outside the epicenter, the church is 
subject to regulation proportionate to the circle within which that 
activity falls––it may still be afforded some First Amendment pro-
tection, but these claims must be examined while simultaneously 
considering general societal interests against discrimination.137 
Thus, activities and relationships falling outside the epicenter may 
be regulated “to differing degrees by the state.”138 
The application of the epicenter analysis in evaluating activities 
that do not fall within the spiritual epicenter can be illustrated by 
examining church-related schools that engage in discriminatory 
practices.139 Under this analysis, the “best way to evaluate a reli-
gious school’s discriminatory admissions policy is to ask to what 
extent enrollment in the school is distinguishable from membership 
                                                                                                             
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 1540–41 (“A church may choose to exclude persons for purely secu-
lar reasons; such a decision is simply outside the purview of civil government. In 
this sense, the right to control membership is absolute.”). 
 135 Id. at 1540. 
 136 Id. at 1539–40 (“Once, however, the church acts outside this epicenter and 
moves closer to the purely secular world, it subjects itself to secular regulation 
proportionate to the degree of secularity of its activities and relationships.”); Lay-
cock, supra note 120, at 1409. 
 137 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1540. 
 138 Id. at 1549. 
 139 Id. at 1541. As previously explained, schools fall in the epicenter if they 
“teach secular subjects with a decidedly religious orientation” or in the first circle 
if they are “dominated by secular courses” and “religious orientation is present 
but not pervasive.” Id. at 1539. 
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in a church,” and thus not a purely spiritual activity.140 In examining 
this issue, a court must first inquire whether the organization—here, 
the school— is, in fact, religious, and then ask “whether the religious 
mission permeates the educational process.”141 If the court decides 
that the school is a religious school whose main purpose is to teach 
classes in a religious context, then the school’s admissions policy 
cannot be regulated in accordance with the free exercise of reli-
gion.142 However, if the school is found to not be predominantly re-
ligious and discriminates in accepting students, the school’s claim 
of exemption from regulation cannot be honored because this falls 
in the quasi-secular circle.143 The practice must be weighed against 
the governmental interest in equality,144 thus subjecting it to inter-
mediate scrutiny. 
The benefit of the circle model is that case-by-case balancing is 
not required, “for implicit in [the epicenter] approach is that the facts 
and circumstances of each case dictate a result for that case.”145 This 
is because there are certain rules and guidelines about what each 
circle includes, so this model clearly lays out where a specific activ-
ity falls, without needing to painstakingly figure out what type of 
scrutiny to apply to any given activity.146 As a result, this model 
provides an excellent basis for evaluating Second Amendment reg-
ulations because the circle model by its very nature provides com-
prehensive guidance and a much more workable method of analysis 
than models currently used.147 
B. The Circle Model and the Second Amendment—Why It Works 
The circle model would be the best model to use to evaluate gun 
regulations because it provides flexibility and ease of use, while at 
the same time providing structure and guidance for a predictable re-
                                                                                                             
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 1542–43. 
 142 Id. at 1543. 
 143 Id. at 1543–44. 
 144 Id. at 1544. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See id. 
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sult. It is logical to apply the circle model because this model pro-
vides the nuance of Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach,148 
but addresses the weakness of his approach, i.e. that it is vague and 
free-wheeling,149 by providing clearer guidance. Justice Breyer’s in-
terest-balancing approach “asks whether the statute burdens a pro-
tected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the 
statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental inter-
ests.”150 This inquiry is similar to the circle model, which requires a 
comparable balancing approach, but is framed differently because it 
does not provide any real guidance to the judiciary in making such 
decisions.151 The Supreme Court rejected the interest-balancing ap-
proach because it was too free-wheeling152 due to the fact that it 
would have required the judiciary to rule on a case-by-case basis 
“whether a constitutional right is actually worth insisting upon.”153 
The circle model corrects this problem because this model does not 
require case-by-case balancing.154 Justice Breyer had the right idea, 
but it simply needed more structure, and the circle model assuages 
the Supreme Court’s concerns155 by providing much more guidance, 
structure, and predictability, while at the same time allowing for 
flexibility and nuance.156 
The circle model also builds on the idea behind the lower courts’ 
use of the two-part test, and commentators’ sliding-scale model, 
which require courts to choose a level of scrutiny “based on how 
close the burdened right comes to the core of the Second Amend-
ment’s guarantee and how severely the challenged [regulation] bur-
dens that right.”157 According to the two-part test, regulations affect-
ing the core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense in the 
                                                                                                             
 148 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 149 Id. at 634 (majority opinion). 
 150 Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 151 See id. 
 152 Id. at 634 (majority opinion). 
 153 Habib, supra note 51, at 1367. 
 154 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1544 (“[F]or implicit in [the epicenter] approach 
is that the facts and circumstances of each case dictate a result for that case.”). 
 155 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
 156 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1544. 
 157 Pratt, supra note 22, at 558–59. 
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home should be evaluated using strict scrutiny.158 But laws that do 
not affect the core right should be evaluated using intermediate scru-
tiny.159 
The circle model builds on these models as it, too, is comprised 
of the belief that the core right requires strict scrutiny and falls at the 
epicenter of the model.160 As one moves further away from the epi-
center, regulations are easier to justify.161 They require less scrutiny 
the further away from the core they fall on the model.162 
However, unlike the two-part test and the sliding-scale model, 
the circle model provides a more comprehensive guide. The two-
part test and the sliding-scale model, which for all intents and pur-
poses are the same thing,163 are incomplete because under these 
models “a restrictive regulation will vary between strict and inter-
mediate scrutiny, based on the impact the regulation has on the core 
of the right.”164 These models fail to include rational basis to evalu-
ate any challenged regulations.165 Rational basis should be applied 
to certain regulations,166 and thus the two-part test and sliding-scale 
model completely disregard this level of scrutiny.167 The proposed 
circle model builds on the two-part test and sliding-scale model and 
brings these models to their logical end, thus providing much more 
guidance in determining whether a specific Second Amendment 
challenge is constitutional. 
It should be noted that First Amendment jurisprudence has pre-
viously been used to elaborate upon and make sense of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence.168 The two-step test first adopted by the 
                                                                                                             
 158 Moran, supra note 61, at 177; Habib, supra note 110, at 13. 
 159 Habib, supra note 110, at 13. 
 160 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539. 
 161 Id. at 1539–40. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 164 Habib, supra note 110, at 13; Moran, supra note 61, at 177. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See infra Section III.C.2. 
 167 Habib, supra note 110, at 13. 
 168 See Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 681; see also United States v. Marz-
zarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right to free speech, an unde-
niably enumerated fundamental right, is susceptible to several standards of scru-
tiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and the type of speech at issue. 
We see no reason why the Second Amendment would be any different.”) (citation 
omitted); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e agree 
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Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella169 was “modeled after 
the approach in First Amendment cases.”170 The court in Marz-
zarella stated that it would look to First Amendment doctrine to in-
form its analysis of the Second Amendment.171 Additionally, many 
commentators have drawn comparisons between First Amendment 
and Second Amendment jurisprudence.172 Thus, because First 
Amendment law has a history of guiding Second Amendment 
law,173 it makes sense to use another First Amendment model, the 
circle model used in the context of church autonomy and freedom 
of religion, to evaluate Second Amendment regulations. 
C. Applying the Circle Model—Determining What Level of 
Scrutiny to Apply 
The application of the circle model is fairly straightforward. The 
circle model in the Second Amendment context is comprised of an 
epicenter with two concentric circles revolving around it.174 The 
core right of bearing arms in the home for self-defense is at the epi-
center of this model and regulations that affect this core right trigger 
the highest level of scrutiny—strict scrutiny.175 As one moves fur-
ther away from the center, the less scrutiny need be applied.176 Any 
                                                                                                             
with those who advocate looking to the First Amendment as a guide in developing 
a standard of review for the Second Amendment.”). 
 169 614 F.3d at 89. 
 170 Bolin & Denzin, supra note 22, at 681. 
 171 614 F.3d at 89 n.4. 
 172 In explaining why certain gun regulations trigger strict scrutiny and others 
trigger intermediate scrutiny, commentators have drawn comparisons between the 
Second Amendment and First Amendment. Certain types of speech regulations, 
such as content-based restrictions, are presumptively invalid and require strict 
scrutiny, and other types of speech, such as content-neutral speech, can be regu-
lated and are subject to intermediate scrutiny. There is still other speech that is not 
protected by the First Amendment. This is a useful analogy for determining what 
level of scrutiny to apply to gun restrictions. Kiehl, supra note 72, at 1165; James 
E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty: Rights with Responsibil-
ities and Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 849, 864 (2014); Brian C. Whitman, Com-
ment, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller’s Second Amendment in Sensitive 
Places, 81 MISS. L.J. 1987, 2016 (2012). 
 173 See sources cited supra note 168. 
 174 See Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539; Laycock, supra note 120, at 1402. 
 175 See Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539. 
 176 See id. at 1539–40. 
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regulations falling in the first circle emanating from the epicenter 
trigger intermediate scrutiny and any regulations falling in the sec-
ond circle trigger rational basis.177 This model provides a much 
more workable method for determining what level of scrutiny to ap-
ply to a specific regulation.178 The circle model provides nuance and 
structure, with fairly predictable results, while still allowing for flex-
ibility.179 Here is a diagram of the circle model and the appropriate 
level of scrutiny that would be applied in each circle: 
 
 
Below, the Author will explain how she foresees the circle 
model being applied to challenged gun regulations affecting specific 
                                                                                                             
 177 See id. 
 178 See id. at 1544. 
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individuals: law-abiding citizens, both with and without mental ill-
ness, and felons. However, even if readers do not necessarily agree 
with the application of the model, namely the following breakdown 
of where these specific individuals fall within the circle model, the 
Author believes readers can agree that the circle model approach is 
still applicable.180 
Individuals without mental illness fall in the core of the model, 
requiring regulations affecting these individuals to be analyzed us-
ing strict scrutiny. One circle removed from the core, requiring in-
termediate scrutiny, is where individuals with mental illnesses fall. 
And two circles removed from the core, triggering a mere rational 
basis review, is where felons fall. 
1. LAW-ABIDING CITIZENS 
For purposes of understanding gun regulations, law-abiding cit-
izens should be broken down into both those with and without men-
tal illness. Below, following the discussion of why law-abiding cit-
izens without mental illness fall in the core of the model, the Author 
will explain why regulations targeting the mentally ill fall in the first 
circle removed from the core, triggering a different level of scrutiny. 
                                                                                                             
 180 The circle model is still open to interpretation and this Comment by no 
means intends to limit how it can specifically be applied to various gun regulations 
affecting specific individuals. Readers can choose where in the circle model they 
believe these individuals fall, and this may not necessarily align with where I have 
placed these individuals. However, I believe that the reasoning behind using the 
circle model, i.e. the approach itself, still holds true and makes this the most sound 
model to evaluate challenged gun regulations. 
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i. Individuals without Mental Illness 
The Heller Court emphasized that the Second Amendment only 
applies to law-abiding citizens,181 so individuals without mental ill-
ness certainly fall in the core of the protection.182 Perhaps the hardest 
line to draw in the application of this model is how to differentiate 
when regulations targeting individuals without mental illness fall in 
the epicenter or the first circle emanating from the center. Generally, 
individuals without mental illness will fall in the core of the circle 
and regulations that restrict such an individual’s right to bear arms 
in the home will be examined using strict scrutiny.183 
However, not all regulations that are aimed at individuals with-
out mental illness will restrict the fundamental right to bear arms in 
the home for self-defense.184 Such regulations should instead trigger 
intermediate scrutiny. Although this Comment focuses on the “who” 
factor, a more comprehensive understanding of this idea can only be 
attained if the “who” factor is looked at in combination with the 
“what, where, and how” factors, i.e. what kind of weapon, where the 
weapon is used, and how it is used. The circle model dictates that it 
is only if all factors—“who, what, where, and how”—fall in the core 
that strict scrutiny applies. For example, if a gun regulation targets 
an individual without mental illness’s ability to use a handgun in his 
home, this certainly triggers strict scrutiny. But if one of those fac-
tors is changed, i.e. the regulation targets the use of guns outside of 
the home, or the use of a semi-automatic gun or a rifle, then inter-
mediate scrutiny applies. A law restricting an individual without 
mental illness’s ability to bear arms in specific places outside of the 
                                                                                                             
 181 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (The Second 
Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”); see Patrick J. 
Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald: “Histori-
cal Guideposts” and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 
AKRON J. CONST. L & POL’Y 7, 27 (2010); Habib, supra note 51, at 1369–70, 
1373. 
 182 See infra Section III.C.1.ii for a discussion of why those with mental illness 
do not fall in the core of the circle model despite being law-abiding citizens. 
 183 See Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539. 
 184 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. 
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home should not be looked at using strict scrutiny, but rather inter-
mediate scrutiny.185 
Thus, as far as the “who” is concerned, for general ease of use, 
individuals without mental illness should fall in the core of the circle 
model, and trigger strict scrutiny. But one must be aware that if other 
factors do not also fall in the core, then regulations affecting such 
individuals might not require strict scrutiny. Thus, in certain circum-
stances, laws that regulate these individuals may fall in the first cir-
cle—triggering intermediate scrutiny. This placement, however, is 
based on many other things, such as the “what, where, and how” 
factors.186 
ii. Individuals with Mental Illness 
The mentally ill187 fall in the first circle emanating from the ep-
icenter of the circle model. To comprehend this breakdown, one 
must understand why some mentally ill individuals are different 
than those who are not mentally ill, why felons are different than 
individuals with mental illness, and thus why regulations targeting 
the mentally ill trigger a higher standard of review than those target-
ing felons. 
Individuals with mental illness are generally not any more dan-
gerous than law-abiding citizens in the general public, but there are 
some mentally ill individuals who may be more likely to commit 
                                                                                                             
 185 It should be noted that in certain situations it is difficult to determine in 
which circle to place individuals without mental illness. This is because these sce-
narios usually involve not only the “who” aspect, but require one to consider the 
“what, where, and how” aspects simultaneously. 
 186 These factors, however, are not the focus of this Comment, so for general 
application, individuals without mental illness should fall in the core. 
 187 It is extremely difficult to define who is mentally ill because most of the 
country could fall into this category. Perhaps the easiest way to determine if some-
one is mentally ill for the purpose of evaluating gun regulations is according to 
the federal standard “banning gun possession only after someone is involuntarily 
committed to a psychiatric facility or designated as mentally ill or incompetent 
after a court proceeding or other formal legal process.” Michael Luo & Mike 
McIntire, When the Right to Bear Arms Includes the Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/when-the-right-to-bear-
arms-includes-the-mentally-ill.html?_r=0. However, few individuals with mental 
health issues reach this point. Id. Some classic examples of afflictions of those 
who are considered mentally ill are schizophrenia, depression, paranoia, and bi-
polar disorder. Id. 
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violence.188 “Past violent tendencies, noncompliance with medica-
tion, and substance abuse are factors” indicating that a mentally ill 
person is more prone to violence.189 “The correlation between soci-
opathic behavior”—a pattern of manipulating, exploiting, or violat-
ing the rights of others—“and criminal behavior is strong.”190 For 
general ease of use of this model, all individuals with mental illness 
fall in the first circle emanating from the core, and challenged regu-
lations that target these individuals should be examined using inter-
mediate scrutiny191 because the government has an important inter-
est in regulating gun ownership among these types of individuals.192 
Additionally, the mentally ill are different than felons because 
despite the fact that some mentally ill individuals are more likely to 
commit violence,193 “there is a clear distinction between those who 
are ‘mentally ill’ and those who are dangerous.”194 Unlike felons, 
just because someone is classified as mentally ill does not mean he 
is no longer a law-abiding citizen.195 And “only about 3–5% of all 
violent acts are attributable to people with a serious mental ill-
ness.”196 Thus, the mentally ill are still afforded some of the protec-
tions of the Second Amendment.197 
By placing the mentally ill in the first circle emanating from the 
core and applying intermediate scrutiny to gun regulations affecting 
these individuals, courts will be able to reconcile198 the Second 
                                                                                                             
 188 Steven W. Dulan, State of Madness: Mental Health and Gun Regulations, 
31 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 9 (2014). 
 189 Id. at 9–10. 
 190 Id. at 10. 
 191 One commentator suggests applying intermediate scrutiny to regulations 
targeting the mentally ill. Id. at 13–14 (The author explains that courts should look 
to First Amendment jurisprudence and the articulation and application of inter-
mediate scrutiny in order to examine regulations targeting the mentally ill. “While 
simply grouping all people with mental illness together and denying Second 
Amendment rights arguably should not pass even rational-basis review, more nar-
rowly tailored and clearly articulated standards could possibly balance the respec-
tive interests at play.”). 
 192 Habib, supra note 51, at 1366. 
 193 See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 194 Dulan, supra note 188, at 2. 
 195 Id. at 9. 
 196 Id. 
 197 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 198 Dulan, supra note 188, at 10–11. 
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Amendment’s protection afforded to law-abiding citizens,199 such as 
the mentally ill, while simultaneously acknowledging that regula-
tions targeting the mentally ill are presumptively lawful.200 Thus, the 
mentally ill have a right to bear arms; however, it is not an absolute 
right because there is an important governmental interest in public 
safety that is also considered.201 
2. FELONS 
As the Supreme Court explained, only law-abiding citizens are 
protected by the Second Amendment right to bear arms.202 And 
“[o]nly law-abiding individuals obey firearm bans and disarm them-
selves in fear of criminal sanctions.”203 The ban on possession of 
firearms by all felons was enacted in 1961.204 Regulations that affect 
felons are presumptively lawful as the Court explained in Heller.205 
But rather than applying a heightened level of scrutiny (i.e. interme-
diate scrutiny) to regulations affecting such individuals as most 
lower courts and commentators would advocate,206 a rational basis 
standard of review is more fitting. 
                                                                                                             
 199 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 200 Id. at 626–27. 
 201 Id.; see Dulan, supra note 188, at 13. 
 202 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (The Second Amendment “surely elevates above 
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-
fense of hearth and home.”); Charles, supra note 181, at 27 (“[T]he Heller major-
ity made it clear that the right only extends to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens 
to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”) (citation omitted); Habib, supra 
note 51, at 1369–70, 1373 (“Likewise, it seems that the central privileges of the 
right to bear arms are available most acutely to ‘law-abiding, responsible citi-
zens.’”) (citation omitted). 
 203 Whitman, supra note 172, at 1988. 
 204 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that Pub. 
L. No. 87–342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961) extended “the disqualification [of arms own-
ership] to all persons convicted of any ‘crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year’, the current federal definition of a ‘felony’”). 
 205 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 206 Moran, supra note 61, at 174 (stating that most lower courts have applied 
intermediate scrutiny when reviewing Second Amendment challenges); Rosen-
thal & Malcolm, supra note 88, at 440 n.13 (explaining that at the appellate level, 
most courts have settled on intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review 
for challenged gun regulations); Habib, supra note 51, at 1374 (“[W]hen regula-
tory schemes seek to regulate or restrict the exercise of the right to bear arms by 
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In light of the fact that the Second Amendment protection only 
applies to law-abiding citizens,207 regulations that affect felons 
should be reviewed under the least restrictive form of scrutiny—ra-
tional basis—despite the fact that the Court in Heller rejected the 
use of this standard of review.208 The Court in Heller rejected this 
level of scrutiny because it would make all regulations constitu-
tional.209 However, the Court only rejected rational basis review in 
relation to law-abiding citizens, because the Second Amendment 
only protects the rights of law-abiding citizens.210 
It is not unheard of for felons to have limited rights—it has long 
been accepted that those who have a criminal capacity and willing-
ness to harm others should forfeit their fundamental right to vote.211 
As a result, it would not be unprecedented for felons to also forfeit 
their right to bear arms. 
Thus, felons fall completely outside the protection of the Second 
Amendment,212 and as per the circle model,213 felons fall in the 
outermost sphere, so regulations affecting them are the farthest re-
moved from the core right of the Second Amendment. These types 
of regulations have the least effect on the core right to bear arms and 
should be reviewed under the least restrictive rational basis standard 
of review.214 
Regulations that affect different types of felons should all be 
viewed under a rational basis review because all of these individuals 
fall outside of the Second Amendment’s protections as they are not 
law-abiding.215 The Author will delve more deeply into regulations 
                                                                                                             
citizens who are not law-abiding and responsible, such regulations will be re-
viewed with a level of scrutiny below strict scrutiny, but above rational-basis.”). 
 207 Charles, supra note 181, at 27. 
 208 Whitman, supra note 172, at 2015 (Heller “declare[d] that rational basis 
should not be employed” as a level of scrutiny for gun regulations.). 
 209 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep 
and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant 
with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have 
no effect.”). 
 210 Charles, supra note 181, at 27. 
 211 Dulan, supra note 188, at 11. 
 212 See supra note 202. 
 213 See Bagni, supra note 23, at 1539. 
 214 See id. at 1539–40. 
 215 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that 
regulations targeting juveniles would fall in the outermost sphere as well and        
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affecting a specific type of felon: the domestic violence misdemean-
ant. 
In 1996, Congress added the Lautenberg Amendment216 to the 
1996 Gun Control Act.217 This Amendment makes it illegal for any 
person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor crime of domestic vi-
olence to own or possess a gun.218 The reasoning behind 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(9) is “that people who have been convicted of violence 
once—toward a spouse, child, or domestic partner, no less—are 
likely to use violence again.”219 Guns clearly exacerbate the problem 
of domestic violence.220 In 2012, 93% of women were killed by a 
male they knew, 62% of these homicides were committed by an in-
timate partner, and the most common weapon used was a gun.221 
According to a study in the Journal of Trauma, “[m]ore than twice 
as many women are killed with a gun used by their husbands or in-
timate acquaintances than are murdered by strangers using guns, 
knives, or any other means.”222 In a survey of battered women, 
                                                                                                             
trigger rational basis review. This is because of the “existence of a longstanding 
tradition of prohibiting juveniles from both receiving and possessing handguns.” 
United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2009); see Charles, supra note 
181, at 18. Juveniles differ from adults in terms of “maturity, judgment and self-
control” and thus the government has an extremely strong interest in regulating 
juvenile gun ownership. Lewis M. Wasserman, Gun Control on College and Uni-
versity Campuses in the Wake of District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 53 (2011). 
 216 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 
 217 Sarah Lorraine Solon, Domestic Violence, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 369, 
388 (2009). 
 218 Id. 
 219 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 220 Josh Sugarmann, For Women, Gun Violence Often Linked to Domestic Vi-
olence, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/josh-sugarmann/for-women-gun-violence-of_b_5913752.html 
(“Reducing gun violence against women goes hand in hand with reducing domes-
tic violence.”); Dylan Matthews, 11 Facts About Gun Violence in the United 
States: Guns Contribute to Domestic Violence, VOX (Dec. 10, 2015, 11:53 AM), 
http://www.vox.com/cards/gun-violence-facts/guns-domestic-violence-united-
states-risk (noting that women have a much greater risk of dying by homicide due 
to domestic violence if they have access to a gun in their home). 
 221 Sugarmann, supra note 220. 
 222 Evan Defilippis, Having a Gun in the House Doesn’t Make a Woman Safer, 
CITYLAB (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/02/having-gun-
house-doesnt-make-woman-safer/8474/. 
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71.4% of respondents reported that their intimate partners had used 
guns these women had in their homes against them, usually threat-
ening to kill these women.223 
The court in Skoien applied intermediate scrutiny to gun regula-
tions affecting domestic violence offenders.224 The court explained 
that domestic abusers often commit acts against relatives that are 
charged as misdemeanors when a similar act against a stranger 
would be a felony, firearms are deadly in domestic abuse, and do-
mestic offenders are likely to offend again and remain dangerous.225 
However, rational basis should be applied to domestic violence 
offenders because these individuals are not law-abiding citizens and 
therefore the Second Amendment does not apply to them.226 Addi-
tionally, the Author has singled out domestic violence offenders be-
cause they pose a particularly high threat to society and have high 
recidivism rates.227 The rate of re-offense by perpetrators of domes-
tic violence is 30% to 40%.228 More importantly, there are few treat-
ment methods that have reduced the recidivism rate of domestic vi-
olence offenders.229 Domestic violence offenders are particularly 
problematic; according to a 2007 study of more than 300,000 ex-
convicts, “offenders with domestic violence charges were the most 
                                                                                                             
 223 Id. (“Indeed, gun threats in the home against women by their intimate part-
ners appear to be more common across the United States than self-defense uses 
of guns by women.”). 
 224 614 F.3d at 642. 
 225 Id. at 643–44. 
 226 Charles, supra note 181, at 27. 
 227 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 644; Jean Reynolds, Domestic Violence—Again and 
Again, L. ENFORCEMENT TODAY (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.lawenforcementto-
day.com/domestic-violence%E2%80%94again-and-again/. 
 228 Reynolds, supra note 227. 
 229 Robert M. Sartin, et al., Domestic Violence Treatment Response and Re-
cidivism: A Review and Implications for the Study of Family Violence, 11 
AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 425, 426 (2006) (“A recent meta-analysis 
of 22 studies evaluating treatment efficacy found treatment for domestic violence 
perpetrators to have only a small effect on post-treatment recidivism . . . .”). 
2017] FITTING A GUN IN A CIRCLE 929 
 
likely of any other group studied to commit another violent fel-
ony.”230 These offenders use their families as a training ground for 
committing other violent felonies.231 
Additionally, commentators have suggested that restricting the 
bearing of arms of domestic violence misdemeanants would have 
been accepted by the Founding Fathers at the time of ratification of 
the Second Amendment because of the Founders’ emphasis on law-
abiding citizens, implying that a low standard of scrutiny would 
likely have been deemed acceptable by the Founders.232 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court established an individual right to bear arms 
in the home for self-defense in District of Columbia v. Heller and 
later extended this right to the states through the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago. 
However, because the Supreme Court failed to express what level 
of scrutiny should be applied to challenged gun regulations in either 
of these landmark cases, post-Heller and McDonald lower courts 
have been left in a state of utter confusion. These courts have applied 
various levels of scrutiny ranging from strict to intermediate to an 
undue burden standard and some have applied a two-step hybrid test 
utilizing strict and intermediate scrutiny. While most courts have 
settled on applying the hybrid two-step test, this approach is not best 
suited to analyzing challenged gun regulations. 
First Amendment doctrine has been used to inform Second 
Amendment analysis regarding why certain regulations trigger strict 
scrutiny and others trigger intermediate scrutiny. Thus, further 
drawing on First Amendment jurisprudence and the circle model 
used in the context of church autonomy, this Comment suggests that 
the circle model should be applied in analyzing Second Amendment 
                                                                                                             
 230 Jennifer Mascia, Domestic Abusers Often Graduate to Other Violent 
Crimes. They Also Often Get to Have Guns., THE TRACE (Dec. 1, 2015), http://
www.thetrace.org/2015/12/domestic-abuse-gun-ownership-planned-parenthood-
shooting/ (“Domestic violence felons experienced a recidivism rate for violent 
felonies of 19 percent, compared to 13.7 percent for offenders with felony assault 
convictions . . . .”). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Charles, supra note 181, at 38–39 (“[I]t is most certain that such a re-
striction would be deemed constitutionally permissible under the requisite low to 
intermediate scrutiny standard of review.”). 
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regulations. According to this model, there is an epicenter with two 
concentric circles revolving around it. The core right of bearing 
arms in the home for self-defense is at the epicenter of this model, 
and regulations that affect this core right trigger the highest level of 
scrutiny—strict scrutiny. Any regulations falling in the first circle 
emanating from the epicenter trigger intermediate scrutiny and any 
regulations falling in the second circle trigger rational basis. This 
model provides a much more workable method of determining what 
level of scrutiny to apply to a specific regulation. Additionally, the 
circle model provides nuance and structure, while still allowing for 
flexibility. 
The circle model builds upon the idea behind Justice Breyer’s 
interest-balancing approach as well as the hybrid two-part test and 
the sliding-scale model. The circle model brings these other models 
to their logical conclusions. While the logic behind Justice Breyer’s 
interest-balancing approach is similar to the idea behind the circle 
model, the circle model provides much more guidance than the in-
terest-balancing approach by providing predictable results as well as 
structure. Thus, regulations need not be analyzed according to the 
free-wheeling interests of the judiciary, as the circle model provides 
a comprehensive guide for where specific regulations will fall.  
Moreover, compared to the two-part test and the sliding-scale 
model, the circle model more accurately takes into account the un-
derstanding that the Second Amendment does not apply to felons, 
but only to law-abiding citizens. Because felons are not protected by 
the Second Amendment, regulations affecting them only need to be 
analyzed using the lowest level of scrutiny. Thus, contrary to the 
two-part test and the sliding-scale model, which apply intermediate 
scrutiny to regulations affecting felons, the circle model suggests 
that felons fall in the outermost circle surrounding the core, applying 
rational basis review to regulations affecting them. 
Law-abiding citizens that do not have a mental illness fall within 
the epicenter of the circle, individuals with mental illness fall in the 
first circle emanating from the epicenter, and felons fall in the outer-
most circle emanating from the epicenter. While some may disagree 
with the application of the circle model and the placement of spe-
cific individuals within the model, the approach itself is still appli-
cable. Individuals who disagree may place specific individuals 
where they see fit in the circle model. This model provides a much 
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more comprehensive guide than the other models currently used to 
analyze Second Amendment challenges. 
